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Abstract
This paper focuses on three unresolved issues with regard to the impact of trade reform. First, many studies
linking trade reform to long run growth are surprisingly fragile. To illustrate the problems with this literature,
we examine a popular measure of openness recently introduced by Sachs and Warner [Sachs, J., Warner, A.,
1995. Economic reform and the process of global integration. Brookings Papers on Economics Activity 1, pp.
1–117]. We show that their measure fails to establish a robust link between more open trade policies and long
run growth. The second puzzle we identify is the small impact of trade reform on employment in developing
countries. Finally, we analyze evidence on the relationship between trade reform and rising wage inequality,
focusing on the 1985 Mexican trade reform. Wage inequality in Mexico rose after the reform, which is
puzzling in a Heckscher–Ohlin context if Mexico has a comparative advantage in producing low skill-intensive
goods.
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1Introduction
Most policy makers at the World Bank or IMF would argue that opening up to trade is an
integral part of economic reform.   In fact, many would argue that there are very few remaining
puzzles regarding the benefits of trade reform.  This attitude is evident from the changing fortunes
of the Trade Policy Division at the World Bank, which was first removed from the Policy
Research Department and then reinstated there.  Although we do not dispute that trade reform is
a well-researched area, the goal of this paper is to identify a number of remaining puzzles.
The focus of many previous studies has been to establish a link between trade policies and
long run performance, measured in terms of either productivity or per capita growth.  Although
these studies typically show a positive relationship between trade reform and productivity growth,
most are plagued by serious econometric and data problems.  To illustrate the problems with this
literature, we examine a popular measure of openness recently introduced by Sachs and Warner
(1995).  The evidence presented in this paper shows that their measure fails to establish a robust
link between more open trade policies and long run growth.  This is the first puzzle presented in
this paper: why is it so difficult to identify a link between trade reform and long run growth?  We
argue that one major reason is the lack of good data on trade policies across countries and over
time.
The second part of the paper moves from aggregate cross-country evidence to examine
the micro evidence on the impact of trade reform.  Do the rents from protection accrue to capital
or to labor?  Most developing country studies to date have focused on the impact of trade reform
2on the labor market.  These studies typically find that the employment effects of trade reforms
have been small.  The small employment responses to very large changes in either trade policies or
trade flows are puzzling.  At the very least, one would expect a larger reallocation of employment
away from import-competing sectors--in both developed and developing countries.  Focusing in
particular on Mexico and Morocco, this paper examines several explanations for the small
employment and output response.  In Morocco, much of the adjustment occurred through falling
profit margins.  In Mexico, much of the adjustment occurred through falling wages in previously
protected, highly unionized sectors.
The paper concludes with a third puzzle.  Do the costs of adjustment to trade reform fall
disproportionately on unskilled workers?  This issue has received widespread attention in the
United States, where earnings inequality steadily increased during the 1980s.  During this period,
the wages of skilled workers in a number of developing countries--including Mexico--also rose
relative to the wages of unskilled workers.  To be consistent with the Stolper Samuelson (SS)
theorem, the increased wage inequality observed in Mexico would have to reflect an increase in
the relative price of skill-intensive goods.  Yet if Mexico has a comparative advantage in
producing goods that use unskilled labor, we would have expected trade reform to lead to a
decline in the relative price of skill-intensive goods.  The puzzle can be resolved by examining
both the pattern of protection in Mexico and the role of other factors (such as direct foreign
investment) during the 1980s.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I examines the evidence on
the relationship between trade policies and long run growth.  Section II summarizes the impact of
trade reform on wages, employment, and profit margins.  Focusing in particular on Mexico and
3Morocco, we explore several explanations for the small employment and output response to large
changes in tariffs and quotas.  Finally, Section III discusses the relationship between rising wage
inequality and trade reform in Mexico.
I. Trade Policies and Long Run Growth
The Relationship between Trade and Growth
Static trade models suggest that movements towards openness can temporarily increase
the rate of growth due to short-run gains from the reallocation of resources, which would imply a
positive relationship between changes in openness and GDP growth.  The new growth literature
also identifies a number of avenues through which openness might affect long run growth. 
Edwards (1998), for example, shows that technological change is a positive function of  both a
country's openness and the gap between a country's technology level and the rest of the world. 
Intuitively, countries which are more backward and provide more opportunities to absorb new
ideas will converge faster to international norms.
Coe and Helpman (1995) discuss how recent models of economic growth imply a positive
relationship between openness to trade and total factor productivity growth, or TFP.  Drawing on
Grossman and Helpman (1991), they argue that differences in TFP can be explained by  either an
expanding number of inputs or higher input quality.  To the extent that countries which are open
to trade can either learn more quickly how to produce these new inputs, or can import them,
openness will be positively related to TFP.
Grossman and Helpman (1991), however, show that in a theoretical framework, the
relationship between opening up to trade and long run growth is in fact ambiguous.  Whether or
4not a country gains from trade depends on a number of factors, including its comparative
advantage vis-a-vis the rest of the world.
The Evidence on Trade and Growth
Although most of the early studies of the relationship between trade and growth find a
consistently positive relationship, many of the more recent studies do not.  This includes both
cross-country comparisons of trade policies and GDP growth, as well as individual country case
studies that examine intersectoral productivity growth and the nature of international competition. 
To illustrate the ongoing debate over the impact of trade policy in the long run, this section briefly
reviews some recent studies on openness and growth.
One of the most frequently cited of the recent studies is Levine and Renelt (1992).  Using
half a dozen different measures of trade policies, the authors find no robust or even consistent
positive relationship between opening up to trade and long run growth.  As a test of robustness,
they apply Leamer's (1985) extreme-bounds approach.  Their measures of trade include the black
market premium, Dollar's real exchange rate index of protection, trade volumes, and two indices
compiled by Leamer.  Yet they do find a robust, positive relationship between investment and
trade shares, as well as between investment and the Leamer index.  The correlation between
investment and trade leads them to conclude that the beneficial effects of trade reform may
operate through enhanced resource accumulation instead of through a more efficient allocation of
resources.  
Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that Levine and Renelt's proposed test of robustness is too
5strong.  He proposes an alternative test, which allows him to construct confidence levels for the
entire distribution of coefficients for different determinants of long run growth.  When he tests for
robustness using this alternative approach, the only openness measure which is robust is a
measure of openness constructed by Jeff Sachs and Andrew Warner.  Yet we show below that
their openness measure does not capture the impact of trade policy per se.
The evidence is no more conclusive for country studies which use detailed micro data to
examine the relationship between productivity and openness to trade.  Pack (1988) points out that
"comparisons of total factor productivity growth among countries pursuing different international
trade orientations do not reveal systematic differences in productivity growth in manufacturing..." 
Bhagwati (1988) writes that:
"Although the arguments for the success of the EP [Export Promotion] strategy
based on economies of scale and X efficiency are plausible, empirical support for
them is not available.  The arguments on savings and innovation provide a less
than compelling case for showing that EP is necessarily better on their account
than IS [Import Substitution]"
Even the most recent efforts to examine the linkages between trade regimes and productivity
growth, using more sophisticated econometric techniques and much better data than previous
work, yield ambiguous results.  Tybout (1992) reviews a number of his own and other studies for
half a dozen developing countries, and concludes the following:
     1 This section has benefited greatly from discussions with  Francisco Rodriguez and Dani Rodrik and, who
are doing concurrent research analyzing the impact of openness measures on growth. 
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"In view of the diverse, ambiguous theoretical literature on the link between trade
and productivity, it is not surprising that stable, predictable correlations have not
emerged."
Using Sachs and Warner to Illustrate Lack of Robustness1
The problems associated with identifying robust relationships between trade reform and
growth is nowhere better illustrated than in a recent Brookings paper by Jeff Sachs and Andrew
Warner (Sachs and Warner, (1995)).  Using a new measure of openness, the authors conclude
there is "strong evidence that protectionist trade policies reduce overall growth..." (p. 51).  Yet
their openness measure is a composite index of trade, exchange rate, and other policies, all of
which could have very different effects on growth. 
Sachs and Warner define an economy as closed if it satisfies at least one of the following
conditions:
(1) Tariffs in the mid-1970s were 40 percent or more
(2) Quotas in the mid-1980s were 40 percent or more
(3) The black market premium (computed separately for the 1970s and 1980s)
was 20 percent or higher in either the 1970s or 1980s
(4) The country had a state monopoly on major exports
(5) The country had a socialist economic system
7An economy is defined as open if none of the above five conditions is satisfied.  Sachs and
Warner find that their composite openness measure is significantly related to long run growth.  As
mentioned above, others, such as Sala-I-Martin, have used this measure to test the robustness of
the association between openness and growth.
Clearly, however, the Sachs and Warner measure captures many other aspects of
openness than pure trade policy.  Quotas and tariffs, for example, provide a good measure of
commercial policy, while the black market premium measures the importance of exchange rate
distortions.  To measure the impact of these policies separately, we estimate a cross-country
growth regression  which corresponds exactly to the specification presented by Sachs and Warner,
except that we decompose their openness measure into its five separate components.  The
dependent variable is the average annual growth in real GDP per capita for the period 1970
through 1989.  The results are reported in Table 1.
In column (1), our control variables include GDP in 1970, the investment to GDP ratio
averaged over 1970 through 1989, primary and secondary enrollments in 1970, and the share of
government consumption in GDP, also averaged over 1970 through 1989. The coefficients on all
these controls are consistent with those from Sachs and Warner.  The coefficient on initial GDP
per capita is negative and significant, indicating conditional convergence.  Investment and
secondary school enrollments are positively and significantly correlated with GDP growth
between 1970 and 1989.  Government consumption is negatively and significantly correlated with
growth.
In column (1), we only include tariffs and quotas out of the five factors used to construct
     2 Rodriguez and Rodrik suggest that a fairer test of the Wachs Warner idea using only tariffs and quotas
might be to create a Sw-type dummy, but using only the relevant two critieria–a country is closed if either t>.4 or
NTB>.4.  We have not done this.
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the Sachs and Warner measure of openness.2  Both tariffs and quotas are insignificant.  A joint F-
test of their significance, reported at the bottom of the table, indicates that the two variables are
jointly statistically insignificant.  Surprisingly, the two measures in the Sachs and Warner index
which are most likely to capture trade policy are not correlated with growth.
The coefficients on all five factors which were used to construct the Sachs and Warner
("SW") openness measure are reported in column (2).  Out of all the five factors, only one is
significant: whether or not the country had a socialist economic system.  The results in column (2)
seem to suggest that the factor driving statistical significance behind the composite measure is the
market structure of the economy, not its trade policy orientation.  In column (3), we add other
controls included in the SW specification:  the number of revolutions and coups, the number of
assassinations per million population, and a measure of the relative price of investment goods. 
With these controls, we find that the socialist dummy, the marketing board dummy and tariffs are
significant, but quotas and the black market premium are not.
In the fourth column, we replace the average black market premium in the 1970s and
1980s with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the premium exceeded 20 percent in either the 1970s
or 1980s.  This variable captures the possibility that exchange rate distortions are only costly if
they are large.  In this specification, we do find that exchange rate distortions negatively affect
growth, but quotas and tariffs both become  insignificant.  Using the Sachs Warner data, the
results suggest in three out of four columns that trade policy is not significantly correlated with
long run growth.  Exchange rate distortions, however, may be negatively correlated with growth.
9At the bottom of Table 1, we also report the results from a number of different F-tests
that we conducted to test for joint significance.  Since some variables could be correlated with
each other, they might not appear as significant individually but they might be jointly significant. 
One way to test for this is to enter these variables individually, as we did in column (1), without
the other variables.  Another way to test for this is to do joint F-tests.  As the results indicate, all
of the variables which failed to be significant individually fail to be significant in joint tests of
significance as well.  Tariffs and quotas are only jointly significant with the black market premium
if the latter is entered as a dummy.  In this case, the variables are jointly significant only because
the black market dummy is significant on its own.
The implications of the results in Table 1 are somewhat disturbing.  Is it that case that no
measure of trade policy is significantly associated with growth?  Sala-i-Martin, in his tests of
robustness, also fails to find any significant correlation between measures of trade policy and long
run growth--with the exception of the composite openness measure.  But as we have seen, the
significance of that measure is driven by other factors--such as the socialist dummy and exchange
rate distortions.  Some could argue that since there is no robust theoretical presumption regarding
the long run effects of openness on growth, these results are only surprising in light of the many
papers which have found a positive relationship between the two.
Right Idea, Wrong Data? 
One possible explanation for these results is that Sachs and Warner have not adequately
measured trade policy.  Their measures of tariffs (on intermediate goods only)  and quotas are
taken from UNCTAD , as collected by Robert  Barro and Jong-Wha Lee.  These data were
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gathered in the mid-1980s, which means that Sachs and Warner use end of period averages to test
average period growth rates. Unfortunately, no time series on commercial policies are available,
which explains why Sachs and Warner use end of period data.
One alternative is to use so-called "effective" tariffs, defined as tariff revenues on imports
defined by import volumes.  This measure of trade policy is not ideal.  However, it is an objective
measure which is available across countries and over time.   It is also highly correlated with
administrative tariffs: for 1985, the correlation coefficient between UNCTAD's tariff measure (as
reported by Sachs and Warner (1995)) and effective tariffs was .60.  This measure has only rarely
been used to measure trade policy.  One exception is Edwards (1992, 1997), which uses this
measure to evaluate the relationship between openness and growth. 
 In Table 2, we replace the measures of tariffs and quotas employed by Sachs and Warner
with the effective tariff.  Columns (1) and (2) replicate the first two columns in the previous table,
but replace SW's measures with our own.  We replace end-of-period tariffs and quotas with
effective tariffs averaged over the period; we replace their measures of the black market premium
with a period average collected from Pick's Currency Yearbook.  Using a specification similar to
Sachs and Warner, we now show strong and significant independent effects of openness to trade. 
Both openness to trade and exchange rate policies have a significant impact on long run growth. 
The coefficient on tariffs, which varies between -.053 and -.059, suggests that an increase in
tariffs  (which vary from 0 to over 100) of 10 percentage points would lead to a reduction in
annual average long run growth of .4 percent.
In the third column, we replace the average black market premium over the period with
the dummy variable closest in spirit to Sachs and Warner: a dummy variable equal to one if the
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BMP was greater than 20 percent in the 1970s or 1980s.  The results are essentially unchanged. It
is interesting to compare the impact of exchange rate distortions with trade policy distortions on
growth.  In all three columns, the impact of exchange rate distortions implied by the estimated
coefficient on the black market premium is much smaller than that for tariffs.  Since the premia are
typically between 0 and 1, a ten percentage point increase in the black market premium implies a
reduction in GDP growth of between .1 and .13 percent.  This is much smaller than the .4
percentage point reduction in GDP implied by a ten percentage point increase in tariffs.
Although these results seem quite robust, in column (4) we again see how difficult it is to
make definitive statements about the relationship between openness and growth, particularly  in a
pure cross-section.  If we add three dummy variables: one for the four East Asian tigers, one for
Latin America, and one for India, the significance on the openness variables again disappears. 
The socialist dummy and the marketing board dummy are significant, but the openness variables
are not.  Nevertheless, by adding so many controls to such a limited number of observations, it is
not surprising that the significance of many variables disappears.  These exercises point to the
limited validity of pure cross-section estimation; the use of panel data--which combine cross-
section and time series data--is likely to yield more fruitful and more robust results (see, for
example, Harrison (1996)).
Trade Policies and Growth: A Research Agenda
The problems associated with identifying the linkages between policies and performance
could be addressed through three different avenues.  First, better data on trade policies should be
made available.  Detailed data on tariffs and quotas are in fact collected by both the World Bank
12
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  At the World Bank, however, such data are often
discarded after a trade policy loan is disbursed or appraised.  A systematic effort to retain these
data would allow researchers much greater scope for policy analysis.  The IMF also collects data
on trade policies annually, in part for its publication on Tr de and Exchange Restrictions.  Yet no
effort is made to systematically report summary statistics--such as tariff means or standard
deviations.  Additional efforts would also have to be devoted to computerizing the information. 
Since significant resources are devoted to collecting information on trade policies at both
institutions, the marginal costs of recording and storing such data should be low.
In addition to data collection efforts, research efforts need to focus on solving the
endogeneity problems associated with the relationship between trade policies and growth.  Does
openness cause growth?  Or is it the other way around?  One promising avenue of empirical
research would be to apply the emerging literature on the political economy of trade policy. 
Political economy models of protection could help to determine what instruments to use for trade
policy, which is clearly not exogenous.  Trefler (1993), for example, shows that the impact of US
trade restrictions on import flows are ten times larger than previously believed, in part because
researchers neglected to account for the simultaneity of policy determination and import volumes. 
This same approach could be applied to the literature on productivity and long run growth. 
Another clever way to address the simultaneity problem is proposed by Frankel and Romer
(1996).  They use geographic proximity as an instrument for bilateral trade flows, which they then
aggregate and use as an independent variable in the second stage to explain growth.  However, it
is difficult to argue that their measure explains the relationship between trade policy and growth,
since their openness measure captures that part of trade which can only be explained by
13
geography.
Finally, research needs to address the independent roles of both exchange rate (macro)
policy and commercial policies.  Black market premia are often used as a proxy for openness, but
may have very different effects than tariffs or quotas in the long run.  Based on Tables 1 and 2,
disentangling the effects of these policies seems very difficult in a pure cross-section of countries. 
Researchers should explore the impact of these policies using panel data, which combine cross-
country and time series data.
II. Trade Policies and Labor Market Adjustment
Evidence on Trade Policy and Labor Market Adjustment
One of the first attempts to measure the partial equilibrium effects of import competition
is Grossman (1986, 1987).  Grossman analyzed the impact of tariff protection in the United
States, finding that wages are fairly unresponsive to (tariff-inclusive) import prices but that
employment responses in some sectors have been quite significant.  Grossman concludes from the
low wage elasticities and higher employment elasticities that there is fairly high intersectoral labor
mobility within the United States.  Other cross-industry studies of the Unites States and Canada
include Freeman and Katz (1991), Revenga (1992), and Gaston and Trefler (1993).  These studies
also find significant effects of changes in import competition on inter-sectoral changes in
employment, but smaller effects on wages.  In the United States and Canada, it appears that trade
policy changes lead to employment reallocation across industries, with very little effects on wages.
Evidence on trade and employment linkages is weaker for developing countries. 
Although Anne Krueger's book on trade and employment in developing countries appeared in the
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early 1980s, we actually know very little about the short-run impact of trade policy reforms on the
labor market.  Krueger (1983) summarizes a project sponsored by the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) to analyze the linkages between trade policies and employment in
ten industrializing countries.  The NBER studies focused on (1) measuring the relative labor
intensity of exportables versus import-substituting production and (2) measuring the extent to
which greater protection encourages a shift towards more capital-intensive means of production. 
Krueger and her colleagues hypothesized that moving towards a more neutral trade regime led to
greater labor intensity in production.  However, none of the case studies directly measured the
actual impact of trade reforms on the labor market--the book merely hypothesizes that trade
reform should lead to employment increases as the labor force shifts towards labor-intensive
tradeables.
Partial equilibrium approaches, similar in spirit to the US studies, have recently been
completed for Uruguay, Mexico, and Morocco. For Uruguay, which introduced trade reforms in
1979 and again in 1985, Rama (1994) used four-digit industry data between 1978 and 1986 to
measure the impact of trade liberalization on employment reallocation and real wages in the
manufacturing sector.  The results show that trade reforms had a significant impact on the level of
employment across manufacturing subsectors, but almost no impact on real wages.  Reducing the
protection rate within a sector by 1 percent led to an employment reduction of between .4 and .5
percent within the same year.  These results suggest that during those years the labor market in
Uruguay was fairly competitive, with significant employment reallocation between sectors after
the reforms.
For Mexico and Morocco, however, employment and wage effects of the trade reforms
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during the 1980s were relatively modest.  Revenga (1997), using plant-level data for Mexico,
finds a moderate reduction in firm-level employment following reductions in tariff levels and
quota coverage.  According to her estimates, changes in tariffs had no impact on employment. 
Reductions in quotas had a significant but relatively small impact: her estimates suggest that a
reduction in quota coverage from 90 percent to 10 percent of output was associated with a 2 to 3
percent decline in employment.  Currie and Harrison (1997) find an even smaller impact on
employment of trade reform in Morocco.  Using plant-level data for Morocco between 1984
(when the trade reform began) and 1990, they find that employment in most manufacturing firms
was unaffected by tariff reductions and the elimination of quotas.  There was a significant
employment response for firms only in some specific sectors--such as textiles and beverages.  The
21 point decline in tariff protection for firms in the textiles, beverages, and apparel sectors was
associated with a 6 percent decline in employment.  Why was the extent of employment
reallocation so low?  We explore several possible explanations for the sluggish employment
response, including rigidities in the labor market, below.
Labor Market Imperfections as an Explanation for Small Employment Responses to Large Trade
Policy Changes: Mexico and Morocco
By industrial country standards, the trade reforms initiated in both Mexico and Morocco
during the 1980s were enormous.  In Morocco, the trade reform initiated in 1984 reduced the
coverage of import licenses (quotas) from 41 percent to only 11 percent of all imports by 1990. 
The maximum tariff fell from 165 % to 45 % during this period.  In Mexico, the trade reforms
initiated in 1985 led to a reduction in the average tariff from 23.5 % to 12.5 % in 1990, and the
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maximum tariff was reduced from 100 % to 20 %.  Import licensing, which covered 92.2 % of all
imports in 1985, covered less than 20 % of all imports by 1990.  (It is unclear, however, whether
these policy reforms translated into large changes in relative goods prices (Hanson and Harrison,
forthcoming).)  In contrast, the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) resulted
in an overall reduction in Canadian tariffs of 2.5 % between 1988 and 1991, and the maximum
tariff reduction was under 9 %.
One puzzling aspect of trade reform in Mexico and Morocco is that it appears to have had
a small impact on wages and the reallocation of employment.  One possible explanation is that
labor market policies such as hiring and firing costs, or minimum wages, preventing firms from
responding to the reforms.  Inability to fire may have prevented employers from reallocating
production to more profitable areas of production; evidence for other countries such as India and
Venezuela suggests that this may be the case.   Minimum wage laws may also have inhibited wage
flexibility and undermined international competitiveness, leading to the observed lack of a wage
response. 
One simple way to test whether imperfections in the labor markets are responsible for the
low adjustment response is to examine changes in output, employment, and trade policies.  If
wages in both countries are flexible and labor adjustment is not costly, variations in employment
should be highly correlated with variations in output.  Lack of employment adjustment could then
be explained by lack of output adjustment to changes in policies.  If output levels only responded
sluggishly to tariff and quota changes, then it would not be surprising if employment failed to
respond as well.
Tables 3 and 4 report correlations between changes in output, employment, and trade
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policies for Mexico and Morocco.  Particularly in Morocco, but also to a lesser extent in Mexico,
the results confirm that employment responded significantly to output changes, but that both
output and employment were not highly correlated with changes in trade policies.  In Table 3,
which reports the correlations for Morocco, the correlation coefficient between changes in output
and employment is .31 for annual data and .48 for long period (from 1984 to 1990) changes. 
However, the correlations between changes in output and trade policies are small in magnitude
and inconsistent.  While tariff increases were positively associated with output changes, changes
in quotas were negatively associated with output changes--although the correlation coefficient in
both cases is very small.  Consequently, it is not surprising that employment changes are only
weakly correlated with changes in trade policies.     
The results in Table 4, which reports correlations for Mexico, are similar but less
dramatic.  The correlation coefficient between output and employment changes is .09 in the short
run and .13 in the long run.  However, there is no consistent positive or negative correlation
between changes in output or employment and our two measures of trade policy changes--quota
coverage and tariff levels.  The lower correlation coefficient between output and employment for
Mexico than for Morocco suggests there is some basis for the assertion that labor mobility in
Mexico is impeded by regulatory or other impediments.  However, the primary issue highlighted
by both Tables 3 and 4 is the lack of a large, consistent output response to trade policy changes
over the short and long run.
In Morocco, other evidence confirms the hypothesis of a fairly fluid labor market.  In
principle, hiring and firing laws are quite severe.  Private firms must first obtain permission from
government bodies to fire permanent employees, and must then pay a severance payment to
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dismissed employees ranging from five weeks (for 5 years of service) up to 38 weeks (for 15
years of service).  Yet in practice, it is unclear how important a role restrictions on dismissals
actually play in allowing private sector enterprises to respond to trade reform.  Restrictions on
dismissals typically only apply to the largest, formal sector enterprises.  In addition, many
enterprises have responded to restrictions on firing permanent workers by hiring temporary
employees, who can be easily dismissed.  The share of temporary workers in manufacturing rose
nearly by nearly twenty percentage points between 1984 and 1990. 
Currie and Harrison (1997) examined the extent to which a sluggish adjustment of the
labor force could explain the low elasticities of employment and wage responses to trade reform
in Morocco.  Using a lagged adjustment model of labor demand to test the speed of adjustment in
Morocco, they found that with the exception of parastatals, employment adjustment takes place
within the year.  Their econometric estimates are in the same range as most of the industrial
country estimates surveyed by Hamermesh (1993).  In terms of the speed of adjustment, private
sector firms in Morocco are more like North American firms than European firms--the latter
typically adjust employment more slowly.  These comparisons support the contention that in
Morocco, despite legislation which on paper appears to be quite restrictive, labor mobility is
comparable to the United States--where there are essentially no restrictions on hiring or firing.  
Another possible impediment to labor market adjustment are minimum wage laws.  In
both Mexico and Morocco, minimum wage laws were in place when the trade reforms were
introduced.  To the extent that minimum wages were binding, they could in principle act as a
barrier to downward wage adjustment, explaining the lack of any wage response to tariff and
quota changes.  In Morocco, the real value of the minimum wage rose by 4.4 percent annually
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during the 1980s, which suggests that it could have played an important role in the adjustment
process.
In practice, however, the evidence suggests that the minimum wage was not a factor in
preventing adjustment in either Mexico or Morocco.  Bell (1994) analyzed both plant-level and
household data for Mexico to measure compliance with minimum wages.  In Mexico, the
evidence suggests that a large fraction of individuals received earnings below the statutory
minimum wage.  Further evidence for Mexico also suggests that the minimum wage had no
impact on overall labor demand.  This reflects both poor compliance as well as the fact that the
real value of the minimum wage fell by 30 percent between 1984 and 1990.
For Morocco, Currie and Harrison (1997) also report evidence which suggests significant
lack of compliance with minimum wage legislation.  Using data for 1986, they report that average
wages at the plant level were below the minimum wage for at least half of their sample.  They also
report discussions with labor inspectors which suggested that they were significantly understaffed
and likely to address only the most serious labor code violations.
While labor-market regulations were not much modified during the process of trade
reform in Mexico, capital-market regulations changed substantially.  One possibility is that the
deregulation of foreign investment may have swamped the effects of changes in trade policy. 
Concomitant with trade reform, the Mexican government removed many barriers to foreign
investment, including limits on the foreign share of equity ownership in a Mexican firm and
requirements that foreign firms obtain government approval for technology transfer from abroad. 
Following these changes there was a dramatic increase in foreign investment, particularly in
assembly plants known as maquiladoras.  The expansion of foreign assembly plants in Mexico is
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the counterpart to the expansion of outsourcing by foreign firms, mainly in the United States. 
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) examine whether the shift from domestic manufacturing into foreign
assembly has influenced the demand for skilled and unskilled labor in Mexico.  For regional
manufacturing industries, they find that the relative demand for skilled labor is positively
correlated with the change in the number of foreign off-shore assembly plants, which suggests that
foreign direct investment may have contributed to increasing wage inequality in Mexico.
Alternative Explanations for the Lack of an Output Response
The correlations presented in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that the sluggish employment
response can be attributed to lack of an output response to quota and tariff changes in the two
countries.  How do we explain the fact that output did not seem to adjust to reductions in quotas
and tariffs?  In Mexico and Morocco, the explanation is three-fold.  First, a real exchange rate
depreciation initiated in conjunction with the reforms cushioned in the impact on firms.  Second,
firms in both countries increased productivity.  Finally, firms in Mexico and Morocco maintained
output (and consequently employment) by cutting profit margins (in Mexico and Morocco) and
cutting wages (in Mexico).
One way to assess the impact of the trade reform is to examine changes in import
competition.  Although many economists would argue that the appropriate measures of trade
policy changes are quotas and tariffs, changes in import volumes provide some insights into the
actual impact of those policy changes.
Between 1984 and 1990, import penetration essentially remained unchanged in Morocco. 
Import penetration in the Moroccan manufacturing sector fluctuated from 37.6 % in 1984, to 36.7
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% in 1987, and finally increased slightly to 39 percent in 1990.  In other words, there was almost
no change in actual imports as a share of domestic sales.  The trend in Mexico during the 1980s is
the same.  In 1984, import penetration in Mexican manufacturing was 12.7 percent.  That share
declined to 8.7 percent in 1987, and then recovered, doubling to 16.2 percent in 1990.  In light of
these small changes in import competition, it is not surprising that output failed to respond.
Why did import penetration in manufacturing, which was certainly the most protected
sector in Morocco prior to trade reform, remain more or less constant throughout the 1980s? 
Although trade reforms in both countries were far-reaching, protection levels still remained high
in comparison to the industrial countries.  In Morocco, despite the elimination of quotas and tariff
reduction, average tariffs remained above 30 percent throughout the 1980s.  In both Morocco and
Mexico, a real exchange rate depreciation cushioned the impact of the trade reforms.  Compared
to other developing countries during this period, the real exchange rate in Mexico and Morocco
depreciated significantly in the mid-1980s, when trade reforms were introduced in both countries. 
In Mexico, however, the real exchange rate began to appreciate beginning in the late 1980s.  
In part, the real exchange rate depreciation in both countries cushioned firms against the
trade reforms.  However, evidence from both countries shows that firms responded to the threat
of more imports by cutting profits.  In other words, the costs of adjustment were shared with
capital.  For Mexico, Venables and Wijnbergen (1993) show that trade reforms led to significant
reductions in price-cost margins.  For Morocco, Currie and Harrison (1997) and de Melo,
Haddad and Horton (forthcoming) show that greater import competition led to significantly lower
margins.  For Morocco, one remaining puzzle is why the costs of adjustment were not shared (at
least partially) by labor in the form of lower wages.  Anecdotal evidence for Morocco suggests
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that profits were very high prior to the reform--possibly allowing manufacturers to sustain
comfortable margins even after lowering prices to compete with the threat of imports.  It also
appears that labor has essentially no market power--allowing capital to collect the rents under
protection and forcing capital to bear a large fraction of the costs of adjustment under trade
reform.
For Mexico, Revenga (1997) finds that labor did share in the rents accruing to protected
sectors prior to reform.  Consequently, she finds that wages fell significantly in Mexico after the
reform.  She estimates that an average tariff reduction of 20 percentage points led to an implied
wage reduction of 5 to 6 percent.
Finally, there is also evidence that firms responded to greater international competition by
raising productivity, allowing them to achieve efficiency gains without shedding labor.  Both
Currie and Harrison (1997) as well as Haddad (1993) show an increase in firm-level productivity
in Morocco following the trade reforms.  Although the evidence for Mexico is somewhat
inconclusive, there is also some evidence of an increase in productivity during the latter part of the
1980s.
III. Wage Inequality and Globalization
General Equilibrium Issues
We began this paper by reviewing the evidence on the relationship between trade and long
run per capita growth.  Despite the problems associated with measuring this relationship, there
does seem to be a positive correlation between openness to trade and long run growth.  Section II
examined the extent to which the gains (or losses) from trade--at least in the short run--could be
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identified in micro level data.  One of the themes which emerges is that even the expected short-
run costs due to reallocating the labor force have been quite small.  One reason is that capital has
shared the costs of adjustment.  Another reason is that the productivity gains from opening up to
trade--captured in the aggregate growth regressions--also appear in the micro data in the form of
higher productivity for individual firms.  In both Mexico and Morocco, many firms responded by
cutting margins and raising productivity.
Although the results presented in Section II address the overall impact of trade on trade
and labor, they do not analyze the distributional consequences of trade reform for skilled and
unskilled labor.  This is an issue which has been extensively studied for the United States and
other developed countries, but much less so for developing countries.  In this section, we focus on
Mexico's experience with trade reform.  Mexico is a particularly interesting case because wage
inequality had been declining in the decades prior to reform in 1985.  Following the trade reform,
however, the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages increased dramatically.
In a world with mobile labor, the impact of trade reform on wage inequality should be
analyzed in a general equilibrium context.  Under the standard general equilibrium framework of
the Heckscher-Ohlin model, trade reform could be associated with increasing inequality if opening
up to trade increases the price of skill-intensive goods (the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem).  In the
Mexican context, this would imply one of two possible hypotheses: (1) Mexico has a comparative
advantage in producing goods which are intensive in the use of skilled labor or (2) Mexico
protected its labor intensive sectors prior to the trade reform.
Hanson and Harrison (forthcoming) present evidence which is consistent with the second
hypothesis.  They show that the most protected sectors in 1984, prior to the 1985 reform, were
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those sectors intensive in the use of unskilled labor.  In particular, they find a negative and
statistically significant correlation between skill intensity in 1984 and tariff protection.  In
addition, tariff declines were highest in sectors which were intensive in the use of unskilled labor. 
The positive correlation between high skill intensity in 1984 and the magnitude of trade reform--
as measured by tariff reductions--is also statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Evidence for other developing countries also suggests a pattern of protection at odds with
comparative advantage.  Currie and Harrison (1997) find that protection in Morocco was
significantly higher in sectors with a higher share of unskilled workers, such as textiles and
clothing.  In Morocco, textile and clothing firms were at the same time highly protected and the
most export oriented in the manufacturing subsector.  Firms made significant profit margins on
the protected domestic market and also exported abroad.  Under trade reform, these firms
expanded their export sales and reallocated employment.
The evidence for Mexico is consistent with the Stolper Samuelson theorem.  Tariff
reductions were greatest in sectors with were more intensive in the use of unskilled labor.  In a
small country which cannot affect world prices, changes in tariffs are an ideal measure of price
changes.  However, other factors--which are not incorporated in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework--
could also have affected the relative returns to skill in Mexico.  Alternative explanations for
increasing wage inequality in Mexico include outsourcing, skill-biased technological change,
falling real minimum wages, and the decline of union strength.   Feenstra and Hanson (1997), for
example, argue that one source of wage inequality in Mexico is the fact that labor demand by
incoming foreign firms is skewed towards skilled workers  
To address these possibilities, we turn to plant-level evidence on the factors that
25
contribute to relative wage and relative employment changes.  In departing from a general
equilibrium framework, we no longer test for the importance of H-O effects on wage inequality. 
In fact, if both skilled and unskilled labor are perfectly mobile across sectors, sector-specific
changes in tariffs and quotas should have an insignificant impact on sector or plant-level wage
inequality.  However, the estimation presented below could be consistent with a specific factors
model, where labor is the specific factor.  For example, if skilled labor is specific to the export
sector, while unskilled labor is specific to the importable sector, trade reform could be associated
with increasing wage inequality in Mexico.  These results are consistent with Revenga (1997),
who argues that unionization gave workers sector-specific rents.  The evidence presented in
Revenga (1997) suggests that Mexican workers in manufacturing adjusted primarily through
sector-specific wage declines, rather than through employment reallocation.  In Morocco, where
unions have no power, there was no evidence of sector-specific wage responses to the trade
reform.
Heterogeneous Responses Across Plants
To motivate our empirical results, we briefly summarize the rationale for estimating cost
share equations and then discuss our departure from this approach.  Previous literature sometimes
specifies a cost function in which technology enters as a separate input and in which changes in
technology over time have a non-neutral effect on labor inputs as classified by skill type. 
We specify the following restricted variable cost function:
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where TVC is total variable costs, which we measure as total labor costs; Ws is the wage of skilled
workers, which we measure as the average wage of white-collar workers; Wu is the wage of unskilled
workers, which we measure as the average wage of blue-collar workers; K is the stock of quasi-fixed
plant and equipment; Y is value added; and T is an index of technology, which we assume is a function
of time.  Subscripts for individual plants are suppressed.
We assume that we can approximate equation (1) by the following translog function:
where , is a disturbance term.  Brown and Christensen (1981) give the formal derivation of the
restricted translog cost function.  Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) and Berman, Bound, and Griliches
(1994) also use a translog restricted variable-cost function to identify the effects of skill-biased
technical change.  
To obtain an expression for variable input demands, we apply Shephard's lemma, which states
that *lnTVC/*Wi = Si, where Si = WiLi/ Ei WiLi, or that derivative of the restricted cost function with
respect to the price of labor type i equals the share of labor type i in total labor costs.  This allows
us to define the variable cost share equation for variable input i: 
27
Nevertheless, there are a number of problems associated with estimating (4).  Relative wages
and value-added both determine and are determined by cost shares.  In addition, we would like to
know whether shares are changing because wages are responding to technology shocks, or
employment levels, or both.  Consequently, instead of estimating (4) we estimate a reduced form for
both relative wages and relative employment levels separately as a function of both technology shocks
and capital stock, the two variables in (4) which are pre-determined.  This allows to identify the
separate effects of technology shocks on both relative wages and relative employment.
 
Estimation Issues and Results
We have annual data on 2,354 manufacturing plants from the Secretariat of Trade and
Industrial promotion (SECOFI) for 1984 through 1990.  We proceed to examine the observable
characteristics of these plants which are correlated with the relative wages and relative employment
of skilled workers.  We do so by regressing the log ratio of white-collar to blue-collar wages and the
log ratio of white-collar to blue-collar employment on measures of (i) plant and industry export
activity, (ii) plant and industry foreign-ownership status, (iii) trade protection, (iv) plant technology
characteristics, and (v) characteristics of labor-market institutions observed at the plant level.  Levels
regressions include dummy variables for the year, region, and two-digit industry.  The sample is all
plants for which we a complete set of observations on the variables described below.  All regressions
are weighted by the plant share of total employment and corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
Appendix Table A.1 lists the variables included in the analysis and gives variable definitions.
The SECOFI sample classifies workers in two categories: obreros, who are equivalent to blue-collar
workers, and empleados, who are equivalent to white-collar workers.  The activities of blue-collar
     3  The excluded categories are small firms (1-50 workers) and the first quintile of the capital-labor ratio.
28
workers include machine operation, production supervision, repair, maintenance, and cleaning; those
of white-collar workers include management,  product development, administration, and general
office tasks.  We identify white-collar workers as skilled labor and blue-collar workers as unskilled
labor.  We measure earnings as the average annual salary for each type of worker in a given plant.
Industry variables are defined at the four-digit level and measured excluding the plant on
which the observation is taken.  Variables that capture export orientation and foreign ownership
status are the share of exports in total sales at the industry level, the share of industry employment
in foreign-owned plants, a dummy variable that indicates whether a plant has positive exports, and
a dummy variable that indicates whether a plant is foreign owned.  We also include the industry
average tariff rate, the average share of industry production that is covered by import licenses, and
the product of the tariff rate and the import-license coverage rate.  
Variables that capture technological change -- either disembodied or embodied in capital
goods  -- are the plant share of imported machinery in total machinery purchases, the plant share of
imported materials in total material purchases, the plant shares of total equipment purchases and
transportation equipment purchases in total investment, lagged plant total factor productivity, and
royalty payments for patents, and copyrights or trademarks as a share of total plant sales.  We also
include dummy variables for the plant employment-size category and dummy variables for the plant
capital-labor ratio by quintile.3  To control for institutional features of labor markets, we include plant
shares of social-security contributions, non-wage payments, and profit-sharing with workers in total
     4  Unfortunately, since non-wage payments, such as social-security contributions and payroll taxes, are not
available separately for white-collar and blue-collar workers, we cannot assess the extent to which using wages
versus total employer costs affects the observed shift in the returns to skill.
     5  Results using average hourly wages in place of average annual wages and total hours in place of average
annual employment are very similar to those described below.
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labor costs.4
Table 5 presents results for the relative-wage regressions.  Relative wages are defined as the
log ratio of white collar to blue-collar average annual average annual wages.5  To ddress the
possibility of multicollinearity, we begin  by regressing  in  the first column relative wages on the two
trade policy variables without any other controls.  We then redo the analysis in first differences in the
second column.  Unfortunately, due to very little time series variation in many of the other
independent variable, we only redo (1) in first differences.  In the third column, we add other
measures of openness.  In the fourth column we add technology and labor market institution
variables.  Finally, in the fifth column we add additional measures of technological change.
In columns (1) and (2), the results are mixed: high industry tariffs are associated with greater
wage inequality, while high quotas are associated with the opposite.  The second column reports the
same regression in first differences: changes in relative wages were regressed on changes in tariffs and
quotas.  The results are again inconclusive: there is no statistically significant correlation between
changes in relative wages and changes in trade policy.
In the next three columns, we redo the analysis, controlling for other measures of openness,
technology, capital intensity, size, and labor market institutions.  Consider first the results for export
activity, foreign ownership, and trade protection.  Plants that participate in foreign product or capital
markets appear to pay relatively high wages to skilled labor.  Relative wages are positively and
significantly correlated with the industry share of exports in sales, indicating that the skilled-unskilled
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wage gap is higher in high-export industries.  Relative wages are also positively correlated with plant-
level foreign investment, but not with sector-level FDI.  These results suggest that  foreign investment
locates in sectors with more income inequality, but that foreign firms themselves pay a higher premium
to skilled workers.  Consistent with the results in columns (1) and (2), relative wages are not
significantly correlated with tariff rates or import-license coverage rates.
Among the technology variables, only the share of royalty payments in plant sales is positively
and significantly correlated with relative wages.  This result suggests that the skilled-unskilled wage
gap is higher in plants that upgrade their technology through licensing arrangements.  No other
technology variables are statistically significant.  Other plant characteristics are also important in
explaining variation in the skilled-unskilled wage gap.  The relative wages of white-collar workers are
higher in medium-size plants, with less than 750 workers.  Relative white-collar wages are also higher
in more capital-intensive plants.  Most of the dummy variables for the capital-labor quintiles are
positive and statistically significant, and all of the plant-size dummy variables are positive and generally
statistically significant.  Relative wages are positively correlated with the share of profit-sharing
payments in plant labor costs, indicating that the wage gap is higher in plants that have profit-sharing
arrangements.  Finally, the increasingly less negative and significant coefficients on the year dummy
variables indicate that there is a strong time trend towards increasing wage inequality that is not
explained by observable plant or industry characteristics.
The OLS regressions with the relative employment of white-collar workers as the dependent
variable are reported in Table 6.  The impact of tariffs and quotas is again mixed, depending on the
specification.  Across the levels specifications, we generally find that high tariffs are negatively
associated with relative skilled employment, while high quotas are positively associated with the
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relative mployment of white-collar labor.  Only the first differences are consistent for both tariffs and
quotas: a reduction in protection is associated with an increase in the relative employment of white-
collar workers.  This result is consistent with Hanson and Harrison (forthcoming), who find that the
pattern of protection prior to reform was skewed towards protecting sectors with a high share of blue-
collar employment.
Among the technology variables, the relative employment of white-collar labor is positively
correlated with royalty payments and the use of imported machinery or material inputs,  and negatively
correlated with equipment investment.  There is a strong positive correlation between the plant capital-
labor ratio and the relative employment of white-collar workers for all but the largest plants.  The
relative mployment of white-collar labor is negatively correlated with the share of social security
payments and the share of profit-sharing payments in plant labor costs, which may indicate that plants
with a stronger union presence -- and hence more mandated payments to labor -- employ relatively less
white-collar labor. 
Although tariff and quota levels are generally not significant in explaining relative wages and
employment, as indicated by the results reported in Tables 5 and 6, this is not surprising.  Proponents
of a general equilibrium framework could simply argue that we cannot capture the impact in this partial
equilibrium, plant-level analysis.  However, the results do point to the importance of foreign
investment, export orientation, and technological change (as captured by royalty payments) in driving
wage inequality.  Since there were significant changes in both foreign investment and export
orientation during this period, with rapid increases in both,  these results suggest that openness
certainly does matter.   Further analysis, on a sample with greater variation over time in many of the
dependent variables, is needed to analyze the importance of these factors.  Nevertheless, there are
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many still unexplained sources of increasing wage inequality in Mexico, as is clear from the
significance of the time dummies in Table 5.
IV.  Concluding Comments
We began this paper with the claim that most policy makers consider our knowledge of trade
policy to be complete.  Our goal was to highlight some continuing puzzles in our understanding of the
effects of trade reform.  We began with an examination of the evidence on trade reform and long run
growth.  Our analysis suggests that many approaches to measuring "openness" are significantly flawed:
as an illustration, we showed that recent work by Sachs and Warner (1995) is not robust.
We then turned to a discussion of the impact of trade reforms at the micro level.  The puzzle
that we focused on in this section was the small impact on employment of large changes in tariffs and
quotas for at least two countries: Mexico and Morocco.  We argued that focusing on labor market
effects ignores other ways in which firms adjust to falling protection--such as reducing excess profits
and raising productivity.
Finally, we concluded by analyzing the impact of trade reform on relative wages in Mexico.
During the 1980s in Mexico the wages of skilled workers rose relative to the those of unskilled
workers.  We assess the extent to which the increase in wage inequality was associated with the 1985
trade reform.  To be consistent with the Stolper Samuelson (SS) theorem, the increased wage
inequality observed in Mexico would have to reflect an increase in the relative price of skill-intensive
goods.  If tariffs fell less in skill-intensive sectors, this would be consistent with the observed increase
in inequality.  We discuss evidence suggesting that protection in Mexico was skewed towards low-
skilled sectors prior to reform, and that tariffs fell most in sectors which had a higher share of unskilled
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workers in 1984.  Although these observed changes in trade policy are consistent with the Stolper
Samuelson theorem, we also present evidence from plant-level regressions suggesting that both foreign
direct investment, export orientation,  and technological change also played an important role in the
observed increase in wage inequality. 
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Table 1: Analyzing "Openness" in Sachs-Warner
Dependent Variable: Average Growth in real GDP per capita, 1970-89
Independent
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tariffs -.315
(-0.3)
-1.001
(-1.0)
-2.092
(-2.0)
-.793
(-1.0)
Quotas -.661
(-0.8)
-0.350
(-0.4)
-.252
(-0.3)
-0.551
(-0.8)
Black Market
Premium in '70s
-- -0.014
(0.0)
-.112
(-0.4)
--
Black Market
Premium in '80s
-- -0.233
(-1.8)
-.161
(-1.3)
--
Black Market
Premium Dummy 
-- -- -- -1.605
(-3.9)
Marketing Board
Dummy
-- -1.041
(-1.3)
-1.489
(-2.0)
-2.057
(-3.3)
Socialist Dummy -- -1.917
(-2.5)
-2.066
(-2.5)
-1.440
(-1.7)
GDP in 1970 -1.319
(-3.4)
-1.551
(-4.1)
-1.481
(-3.8)
-1.419
(-4.2)
Ratio of Investment to
GDP
15.195
(4.7)
12.284
(3.7)
7.751
(2.0)
6.653
(1.8)
Primary Enrollment
in 1970
4.864
(2.8)
-.392
(-0.4)
-.298
(-0.3)
.130
(0.2)
Secondary
Enrollment in 1970 
-.280
(-0.3)
5.211
(3.1)
4.793
(2.6)
3.145
(2.3)
Government
Consumption/GDP
-7.449
(-1.7)
-8.467
(-2.1)
-6.820
(-1.6)
-3.844
(-1.0)
Revolutions and
Coups Dummy 1/
-- -- -.648
(-0.7)
-.236
(-0.3)
Assassinations
Dummy 2/
-- -- -2.896
(-2.2)
-3.028
(-2.3)
Relative Price of
Investment Goods  3/
-- -- -1.092
(-3.0)
-.931
(-2.4)
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F-Value 4/ 0.4 0.7 2.2 0.9
F-Value 5/ -- 2.0 1.4 --
F-Value 6/ -- 1.5 1.9 5.5
Number of
Observations
72 72 71 71
R-square .41 .50 .46 .64
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis.  All specifications corrected for arbitrary  heteroskedasticity.  For
further
 information on the variables used in Tables 1 and 2, see Sachs and Warner (1995).
1/ The number of revolutions and coupts per year, averaged over 1970-85
2 /The average number of assissinations per million population, 1970-85
3/ This is the deviation of the log of the price level of investment from the cross-country sample mean in
1970.
4/ Tests for the joint significance of Tariffs and Quotas.
5/ Tests for the joint significance of the Black Market Premium in the 1970s and 1980s.
6/ Tests for the joint significance of Tariffs, Quotas, and the Black Market Premium.
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Table 2: Does It Help to Use "Better" Data?
Dependent Variable: Average Growth in real GDP per capita, 1970-89
Independent
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effective Tariff
(Period Average)
-.053
(-2.6)
-.059
(-2.9)
-.047
(-2.2)
-0.023
(-1.4)
Black Market
Premium (Period
Average)
-1.288
(-2.7)
-1.074
(-2.3)
-- --
Black Market
Premium Dummy 
-- -- -.962
(-2.6)
-.429
(-1.2)
Marketing Board
Dummy
-1.523
(-2.5)
-1.803
(-3.1)
-1.979
(-3.3)
-2.386
(-5.1)
Socialist Dummy -1.079
(-2.6)
-1.124
(-2.5)
-1.893
(-2.4)
-2.125
(-5.0)
GDP in 1970 -1.542
(-4.8)
-1.387
(-3.9)
-1.417
(-3.9)
-.921
(-2.4)
Ratio of Investment to
GDP
10.139
(3.4)
8.374
(2.3)
7.136
(1.8)
-.272
(-0.1)
Primary Enrollment
in 1970
-.033
(0.0)
-.122
(-0.1)
.388
(0.4)
1.862
(2.0)
Secondary
Enrollment in 1970 
3.499
(2.3)
2.967
(1.8)
3.239
(1.9)
2.390
(1.5)
Government
Consumption/GDP
-7.198
(-2.20
-5.087
(-1.5)
-4.572
(-1.20
-4.150
(-1.3)
Revolutions and
Coups  Dummy 1/ 
-- -0.045
(0.0)
.180
(.2)
-0.097
(-0.2)
Assassinations
Dummy 2/
-- -2.491
(-2.1)
-2.900
(-2.2)
-1.72
(-1.4)
Relative Price of
Investment Goods 3/
-- -.874
(-2.3)
-.874
(-2.3)
1.862
(2.0)
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East Asia Dummy No No No Yes
Latin America
Dummy
No No No Yes
India Dummy No No No Yes
F-Value -- -- -- 1.3
N 75 73 71 73
R-square .50 .52 .46 .73
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis.  All specifications corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity.  For
further information on the variables used in Tables 1 and 2, see Sachs and Warner (1995).
1/ The number of revolutions and coupts per year, averaged over 1970-85
2/ The average number of assissinations per million population, 1970-85
3/ This is the deviation of the log of the price level of investment from the cross-country sample
mean in 1970.
4/ Tests for the joint significance of  black market premium dummy and tariffs in columns (4). 
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Table 3: Employment, Output and Trade Reform in Morocco
Morocco, Year to Year Changes
Log Change
in Output
Log Change
in Number
of Workers
Change in
Import
Penetration
Change in
Tariffs
Change in
Quota
Coverage
Log Change in
Output
1.00 0.314 -0.016 0.022 -0.010
Log Change in
Workers 
1.00 0.005 -0.008 -0.010
Change in Import
Penetration
1.00 -0.185 -0.048
Change in Tariffs 1.00 0.215
Change in Quota
Coverage
1.00
Long Period Changes (1984 and 1990 Only)
Log Change
in Output
Log Change
in Number
of Workers
Change in
Import
Penetration
Change in
Tariffs
Change in
Quota
Coverage
Log Change in
Output
1.00 0.481 -0.055 0.008 -0.052
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Log Change in
Workers 
1.00 -0.023 -0.066 -0.062
Change in Import
Penetration
1.00 -0.255 -0.039
Change in Tariffs 1.00 0.200
Change in Quota
Coverage
1.00
Table 4: Employment, Output and Trade Reform in Mexico
Mexico, Year to Year Changes
Log Change
in Output
Log Change
in Number
of Workers
Change in
Tariffs
Change in
Quota
Coverage
Log Change in
Output
1.00 0.092 0.025 0.058
Log Change in
Workers 
1.00 -0.010 0.056
Change in Tariffs 1.00 -0.155
Change in Quota
Coverage
1.00
Long Period Changes (1984 and 1990 Only)
Log Change
in Output
Log Change
in Number
of Workers
Change in
Tariffs
Change in
Quota
Coverage
Log Change in
Output
1.00 0.133 -0.087 0.174
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Log Change in
Workers 
1.00 -0.057 0.000
Change in Tariffs 1.00 0.112
Change in Quota
Coverage
1.00
Table 5: Variation in Relative White Collar Wages
Across Plants
(T-Values in Parentheses)
Dependent Variable: Relative wage
Change in
Relative wage Relative wage Relative wage Relative wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trade Variables
    Export Share
        (Industry) 
- - .113
(1.6)
.118
(1.7)
.137
(1.8)
    Foreign Share
        (Industry)
- - -.068
(-1.5)
-.070
(-1.5)
-.088
(-1.9)
    Export Industry - - .003
(0.2)
.004
(0.2)
.002
(.1)
    Foreign Dummy - - .131
(8.1)
.127
(7.9)
.134
(8.0)
    Tariff (Tar) 2.853
(8.5)
- -.00002
(0.0)
-00004
(-0.3)
-.0001
(-0.1)
    Import
       Licence (QR)
-1.306
(-5.3)
.0001
(0.3)
.0001
(0.2)
.0002
(0.4)
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    dTar - -.0013
(-1.4)
- - -
    dQR - -.0002
(-0.8)
- - -
Technology Variables
     TPP (Lag) - - - .004
(0.3)
.005
(0.4)
     Royalty Payments - - - .090
(2.2)
.136
(2.7)
     Imported Machinery - - - - .0004
(0.0)
     Equipment
         Investment
- - .034
(1.4)
     Imported Materials - - - - -.063
(-1.3)
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Average Plant Size:
       51    to      100 - - .090
(5.1)
.088
(5.0)
.076
(3.5)
      101   to       100 - - .089
(5.1)
.088
(5.0)
.051
(2.4)
      251   to      500 - - .100
(5.1)
.100
(5.0)
.053
(2.2)
      501   to       750    - - .087
(3.2)
.084
(3.0)
.046
(1.5)
       750 Workers - - .004
(0.2)
.010
(.4)
-.032
(-1.1)
Capital-Labor Ratio
    2nd Quintile - - .038
(1.5)
.036
(1.4)
.049
(1.8)
     3rd Quintile - - .073
(2.4)
.074
(2.6)
.074
(2.4)
     4th Quintile - - .133
(5.1)
.130
(4.9)
.141
(.5.0)
     5th Quintile - - .126
(4.4)
.116
(3.8)
.125
(3.8)
Labor Market Institutions
     Social Security - - - -.138
(-.5)
-.192
(-0.7)
     Non-wage Costs - - - -.087
(-0.7)
-.081
(-0.6)
     Profit Sharing - - - .342
(3.3)
.336
(3.1)
1987 Year Dummy .166
(.3)
-0.006
(-0.3)
-.231
(-6.9)
-.218
(-6.5)
-.224
(-6.3)
1988 Year Dummy .155
(.3)
.001
(0.1)
-.224
(-7.8)
-.211
(-7.3)
-.226
(-7.4)
1989 Year Dummy .525
(.1)
.031
(1.4)
-.170
(-7.5)
-.167
(-7.4)
-.173
(-7.1)
1990 Year Dummy -.138
(0.0)
.102
(3.1)
-.070
(-2.3)
-.072
(-2.4)
-.073
(-2.2)
R-Square .18 .01 .17 .18 .19
Number of Observations 9355 9334 8021 8021 6652
Note: All levels regressions include industry dummies and region (state) dummies, not reported here.
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Table 6: Determinants of the Variation in Relative White Collar Employment
Across Plants
(T-Values in Parentheses)
Relative
Employment 
Change in
Relative
Employment
Relative
Employment
Relative
Employment 
Relative
Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trade Variables
    Export Share
        (Industry) 
- - -.404
(-3.7)
-.417
(-3.9)
.366
(-3.4)
    Foreign Share
        (Industry)
- - .378
(6.1)
.365
(5.9)
.359
(5.7)
    Export Dummy - - .092
(3.4)
.094
(3.6)
.058
(2.1)
    Foreign Dummy - - .166
(5.8)
.165
(5.9)
.156
(5.6)
    Tariff (Tar) .1030
(3.7)
- -.0025
(-1.4)
-.0021
(-1.2)
-.0023
(-1.3)
    Import
       Licence (QR)
.0040
(0.2)
.0013
(2.4)
.0014
(2.6)
.0013
(2.3)
    dTar - -.0008
(-1.5)
- - -
    dQR - -.0003
(-3.4)
- - -
Technology Variables
   TPP (Lag) - - - .029
(1.0)
.027
(.8)
    Royalty Payments - - - .359
(6.0)
.272
(3.9)
    Imported Machinery - - - - .593
(7.2)
    Equipment 
        Investment - - - - -.263
(-6.8)
    Imported Materials - - - - .593
(7.2)
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Average Plant Size:
      51     to      100 - - .040
(1.3)
.044
(1.4)
-.0002
(0.0)
     101    to      100   - - .078
(2.6)
.073
(2.4)
.079
(2.2)
      251   to      500 - - .147
(4.3)
.140
(4.0)
.162
(1.3)
      501   to       750    - - .043
(1/0)
.039
(0.9))
.061
(1.3)
       750 Workers - - -.163
(-4.1)
-.174
(-4.2)
-.126
(-2.7)
Capital-Labor Ratio
    2nd Quintile - - .317
(8.1)
.318
(8.2)
.291
(6.7)
     3rd Quintile - - .355
(8.9)
.357
(9.0)
.360
(8.4)
     4th Quintile - - .323
(7.6)
.322
(7.5)
.299
(6.5)
     5th Quintile - - .151
(3.5)
.164
(3.7)
.161
(3.4)
Labor Market Institutions
      Social Security - - - -1.445
(-4.35)
-1.184
(-3.1)
      Non-wage Costs - - - .036
(0.2)
-.056
(-0.4)
      Profit Sharing - - - -.380
(-2.7)
-.363
(-2.6)
1987 Year Dummy -.012
(-.4)
-.003
(-1.0)
.063
(1.3)
.040
(.8)
.043
(0.4)
1988 Year Dummy -.959
(-0.4)
.0012
(0.1)
.079
(1.7)
.055
(1.2)
.059
(1.2)
1989 Year Dummy -.706
(-0.3)
-.021
(-1.8)
.016
(.4)
.030
(.8)
.035
(.9)
1990 Year Dummy -.655
(-0.2)
-.020
(-1.6)
.016
(.4)
.021
(.6)
.031
(.8)
R-Square .57 .00 .35 .36 .39
Number of Observations 9355 9337 8021 8021 6652
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Appendix:  Table A.1 Variable Definitions
Variable Definitions
Export Sharea: Industry share of total sales going to export markets.
Foreign Sharea: Industry share of total employment in foreign-owned enterprises (with employment in foreign
enterprises weighted by foreign-equity share).
Export Dummy:Equals one if plants has positive exports.
Foreign Dummy: Equals one if plant has positive foreign-equity participation.
Tariffa: Mean tariff (%) on outputs by four-digit industry.
Import Licensea: Mean share of outputs subject to import-license requirement by four-digit industry.
Imported MachineryShare of imported machinery in total machinery purchases.
Imported Materials:Share of imported material inputs in total material input purchases.
Equipment Investment:Share of equipment purchases in total investment.
Transport Share of transport equipment purchases in total investment.
Investment:
TFP Percentage change in real output less weighted changes in material inputs, capital inputs, and
number of employees, with weights given by the share of these inputs in total sales.  Real output is
defined as sales deflated by a four-digit product price deflator.  Material inputs are deflated by a
material price deflator.
Royalty Payments: Royalty payments for patents, copyrights, or trademarks as a share of total plant sales. 
Capital-Labor Ratio:Reported capital stock valued at replacement rates (deflated by the PPI) / Number of Employees.
Social Security: Share of social-security contributions by the plant in total payroll costs.
Non-wage Costs: Share of other non-wage costs paid by the plant in total payroll costs.
Profit Sharing: Profit-sharing as a fraction of total payroll costs.
a Industry refers to the four-digit Mexican standard industrial classification (SIC).
